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Presidential Politics as a Safeguard of
Federalism: The Case of Marijuana
Legalization
DAVID S. SCHWARTZ†
INTRODUCTION
How does the United States constitutional system best
preserve federalism? The debate over the so-called “political
safeguards of federalism” asks whether federal courts can
and should defer to the political process or instead apply
non-deferential judicial review when confronting a claim
that federal legislation has exceeded the enumerated
powers of Congress.1 With this debate now approaching its
sixtieth year, its main lines of argument are well worn.
Nevertheless, there are important aspects of the political
† Foley & Lardner-Bascom Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law
School. I am grateful to the participants in the Fall 2013 Wisconsin Discussion
Group on Constitutionalism for their extremely helpful comments: Jenna
Bednar, Eric Berger, Andrew Coan, Erin Delaney, Donald Downs, Heather
Gerken, Mark Graber, Heinz Klug, Alison LaCroix, Gerard Magliocca, Robert
Mikos, Howard Schweber, and Emily Zackin. I would also like to thank Liz
Sanger, James Meadows, and Renee Parton for their invaluable research
assistance.
1. The iconic exposition of this idea is Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Rôle of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). Influential
developments and refinements of Wechsler’s ideas are found in JESSE H.
CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 175, 171-259 (1980);
Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 279 (2000). For leading examples of the
argument against the political safeguards of federalism, see, for example,
Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers”: In
Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995); William
Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures of Process Federalism, 22
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 139 (1998); Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459
(2001); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV.
1311 (1997).
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safeguards of federalism that have gone largely
unrecognized or underappreciated and which, if analyzed
more closely, could shed important new light on this
decades-old debate. In this Article, I draw attention to two
interrelated elements of political safeguards theory that
warrant the scrutiny of constitutional scholars.
First, scholars on both sides of the political safeguards
debate have underemphasized, if not ignored, the impact
that presidential politics has in protecting the regulatory
autonomy of states from undue encroachment by federal
law. The main emphasis has instead always been placed on
Congress, with further reference to political parties and
only the vaguest of nods to the Electoral College. Yet as the
chief executive with ultimate responsibility to enforce
federal laws, the President is arguably positioned to have
the most far-reaching impact on state regulatory autonomy
of the three branches of the federal government. I argue
that the political safeguards debate is radically incomplete
without a robust account of the role of the President in
protecting federalism.
Second, greater attention needs to be paid to questions
of the responsiveness or sensitivity of federal governmental
institutions to state autonomy. The debate on this issue has
tended to fall into the error that Neil Komesar has
identified as “single-institutional analysis,” when what is
needed is comparative institutional analysis.2 Specifically,
scholars have debated political safeguards theory as if the
question turned entirely on whether political structures
make Congress sufficiently responsive to state autonomy,
without seriously comparing that to how sensitive the
courts are. A complete airing of the political safeguards
debate requires at least a robust comparison of the relative
institutional sensitivity to state autonomy of all three
branches of the federal government.
This Article represents a step in that direction by
undertaking that comparison with respect to a current
2. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 6 (1994); NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS:
THE RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS 23 (2001).
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federalism controversy: state marijuana legalization. This
issue presents a momentous opportunity to make a case
study of how the three branches of the federal government
protect state regulatory autonomy.
Advocates of judicial protection argue that federal laws
arguably encroaching on state sovereignty should be subject
to rigorous and less- or non-deferential judicial review. The
opposing position argues that such active and rigorous
judicial review is unnecessary (and counterproductive): the
U.S. political process supplies all the protection of the states
that our federal system requires. This latter argument,
dubbed “the political safeguards of federalism,”3 has been
variously formulated, sometimes emphasizing formal
political structures outlined in the Constitution, sometimes
emphasizing informal political structures, such as the role
of political parties. But proponents of the “political
safeguards” theory have consistently overlooked an element
of the political process that adds force to their theory. I
argue that presidential electoral politics—the strategic and
tactical decisions that presidential aspirants make to win
critical swing state electoral votes in closely-contested
presidential elections—can under certain conditions provide
powerful protection to federalism. Specifically, presidential
electoral politics will tend to protect federalism when one or
more key “swing states” has a salient policy preference that
is inconsistent with a well-supported national policy
alternative, where the next presidential race is expected to
be close. Presidential aspirants or incumbent presidents
thinking ahead to their own or their party successor’s
election chances will shape their policies and issue positions
with careful attention to the policy preferences of swing
states.
These conditions are present in the current regulatory
regime for marijuana. Marijuana legalization represents the
most pointed federal-state policy conflict since racial
desegregation. Allowed by twenty states,4 medical use of
3. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 543-46.
4. Medical Use, NAT’L ORG. FOR REFORM MARIJUANA LAWS (NORML),
http://norml.org/marijuana/medical (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) [hereinafter
Medical Use].
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marijuana (and in two states, “recreational” use of
marijuana) remains flatly prohibited by federal criminal
law. Yet because many of these states are “battleground” or
“swing” states whose electoral votes can tip a close
presidential election, an incumbent President planning to
seek reelection must tread carefully in enforcing federal
criminal laws against marijuana. Hence, while little if any
protection of state regulatory choice in this area has
emanated from Congress or the Supreme Court, the Obama
Administration has effectively permitted medical marijuana
by dialing down enforcement of marijuana laws in these
states. Meanwhile, Obama’s Republican rivals failed to
make an issue of his Administration’s comparatively “softon-drugs” stance, signaling the abandonment of a
presidential campaign strategy used consistently by
Republicans for the past forty years. This record, I argue,
provides strong evidence that presidential electoral politics
can be far more sensitive to state regulatory autonomy
interests than the courts and perhaps even than Congress.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FEDERALISM:
JUDICIAL OR POLITICAL?
Judicial review always comes down to a question of
deference: to what extent will a court defer to, or rigorously
second guess, the policy choices of legislative bodies? The
degree of deference adopted by the Supreme Court has
varied over time and by subject. For example, in its modern
jurisprudence, the Court applies strict, non-deferential
judicial review to laws classifying by race or infringing free
speech.5 But the Court applies deferential review to
legislative classifications regulating economic matters.6

5. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (applying
strict scrutiny to laws regulating speech); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
308 (2003) (applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications).
6. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731-32 (1963) (reviewing
economic regulations deferentially); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938) (same).
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Laws reviewed non-deferentially are frequently struck
down; laws reviewed deferentially, rarely so.7
Constitutional doctrine reformulates the question of
whether federalism will be protected judicially or politically
by asking what the courts’ role should be in determining
whether the regulated matter falls within the national
legislative power. Under the theory of “enumerated powers,”
the legislative jurisdiction of Congress is limited to those
matters specifically articulated in the Constitution, while
the states retain exclusive legislative jurisdiction over all
other matters falling outside the reach of congressional
power. The Supreme Court has always maintained that if
the regulation at issue is within the legislative reach of
Congress, the courts may not second-guess its wisdom or
effectiveness—the latter question being purely political
rather than judicial. As Chief Justice Marshall famously
phrased the matter:
[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass
laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the
government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal,
should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say that
such an act was not the law of the land. But where the law is not
prohibited, and is really calculated to effect any of the objects
entrusted to the government, to undertake here to inquire into the
degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line which
circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legislative
8
ground. This court disclaims all pretensions to such a power.

But it should also be apparent that Marshall’s
formulation is ambiguous on the definitional question of
whether the “object” of the law is one “entrusted to the
[national] government.” That question too may be reviewed
deferentially or non-deferentially, and Marshall does not
say which. The ambiguity inherent in this foundational
Marshall opinion has played out throughout U.S.
constitutional history.
7. Compare, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-15 (1993)
(rational basis review “is a paradigm of judicial restraint”), with, e.g., Police
Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (Court has “frequently
condemned” content discrimination in regulation of speech).
8. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
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A. The “Unsteady Path” of Judicial Review of Federalism
The Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence over the
past century has charted “an unsteady path,” in the
understated words of Justice O’Connor.9 Her phrase refers
to a history of vacillation between non-deferential and
deferential review of federalism boundary disputes.
The most significant line of doctrine has involved the
Court’s interpretation of the scope of the Commerce
Clause.10 During the so-called “Lochner era,” from the late
1880s to 1937, the Court struck down numerous federal
laws aimed at regulating the national economy, taking the
position that broad areas of economic endeavor—
employment, manufacturing, mining, agriculture—were
“local” in nature and subject to exclusive state legislative
jurisdiction.11 Between 1937 and 1942, the Court famously
reversed course, adopting a highly deferential approach to
national economic legislation. Under this approach,
Congress could regulate any activity that, viewed in the
aggregate, had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.12
This “substantial effects” test permits Congress to regulate
not only major industries, but also very minor intrastate
participants in interstate markets. Over the next five
decades, the Court thus upheld the application of the
federal Agricultural Adjustment Act to a farmer’s small
wheat crop grown for home consumption13 and the

9. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992).
10. “The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes[.]” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
11. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936); A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935); Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S.
1, 16 (1895).
12. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100, 119 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37
(1937).
13. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29.
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application of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to a small roadside
restaurant that refused to serve black patrons.14
The breadth of the substantial effects test greatly
expanded the Court’s understanding of the legislative
domain of Congress. But perhaps as important was the
Court’s deference to Congress in the threshold decision of
whether the test had been satisfied. The Court typically
deferred to Congress on the definitional questions of
whether a local activity was part of an interstate market,
and whether that activity in the aggregate substantially
affected the interstate market. These were matters for the
reasonable discretion of Congress.15 So the law stood for
nearly sixty years.
A less prominent line of doctrine applied the Tenth
Amendment, which provides that “The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to
the people.”16 Prior to 1937, the Court had viewed the Tenth
Amendment as an independent limitation on the powers of
Congress, barring regulation even of interstate commerce
that unduly interfered with purportedly local legislative
matters.17 The Court overruled this understanding of the
Tenth Amendment in 1941, holding that “[the Tenth]
amendment states but a truism that all is retained [by the
states] which has not been surrendered.”18 At this point, the
14. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 296-97, 304 (1964).
15. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 603 (1995) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); id. at 616-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
17. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273-74, 276 (1918)
(striking down law prohibiting interstate shipment of child-made goods on
ground that it unduly interfered with intrastate employment relations, in
contravention of the Tenth Amendment).
18. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941). The Court
continued:
There is nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was
more than declaratory of the relationship between the national and
state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before
the amendment or that its purpose was other than to allay fears that
the new national government might seek to exercise powers not
granted . . . .
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Tenth Amendment appeared to offer no protection to state
autonomy against congressional encroachment.
However, the Court carved out a narrow but significant
exception to this view of the Tenth Amendment in 1976, in
National League of Cities v. Usery.19 There, the Court
reversed a merely eight-year-old precedent20 by holding that
federal minimum wage laws could not be constitutionally
applied to state and local government employees.21 The
Court reasoned that the Tenth Amendment prohibited
Congress from regulating “the states as states,” and thus
certain “traditional governmental functions” were immune
from federal regulation.22 But National League of Cities was
an unstable precedent sustained by a 5-4 majority with the
fifth vote coming from an admittedly uncertain Justice
Blackmun.23 Over the next few years, the Court created
several exceptions to the National League of Cities
exception—and the pendulum seemed to swing back toward
Congressional power.24
In its 1985 decision in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,25 the Court reversed itself
Id. at 124.
19. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
20. See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 187-88, 190-91 (1968) (holding that
the federal Fair Labor Standards Act applied to state employees).
21. Nat’l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 840.
22. Id. at 852, 855.
23. See id. at 834, 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
24. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 239 (1983) (holding that the federal
Age Discrimination in Employment Act applied to state employees because Act
did not “‘directly impair’ the State’s ability to ‘structure [its] integral
operations’”); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 771 (1982) (upholding federal
statute that required states to “consider” the enactment of various energy
regulation standards because the law did not “compel the exercise of the State’s
sovereign powers”); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678,
686-87 (1982) (applying federal Railway Labor Act to state operated railroad
because railroad operation was not a traditional governmental function); Hodel
v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n 452 U.S. 264, 284-85, 288-89 (1981)
(upholding federal environmental law against Tenth Amendment challenge
because law did not impair state’s ability to perform traditional functions).
25. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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for the second time in less than twenty years—a virtually
unheard-of step—and overruled National League of Cities.26
Again, the issue was whether the federal Fair Labor
Standards Act applied to state and local employees, and this
time the Court held that it did.27 Justice Blackmun, who
switched sides to make the difference, wrote the 5-4
majority opinion concluding that “the attempt to draw the
boundaries of state regulatory immunity in terms of
‘traditional governmental function’ is not only unworkable
but is also inconsistent with established principles of
federalism.”28 Of significance for the argument of this
Article, the Garcia Court attempted to lay out a manifesto
in support of deferential judicial review of limitations on the
powers of Congress vis-à-vis the states. The opinion offered
an extended argument that the political process, rather
than rigorous judicial review, offered the primary safeguard
for federalism.29 This argument will be developed further in
the next Section.
The Court’s forceful and detailed articulation in Garcia
might well have resolved the controversy in favor of the
argument that the political structures in the Constitution
and political realities outside it will protect federalism
better than non-deferential judicial review. But it didn’t. In
Garcia itself, then-Justice Rehnquist warned that the Tenth
Amendment principle of National League of Cities “will, I
am confident, in time again command the support of a
majority of this Court.”30
Rehnquist was partly correct. In 1991, the Court held
that state sovereignty interests rooted in the Tenth
Amendment mandated a limiting construction of the federal
Age Discrimination in Employment Act such that the law
would not prohibit states from imposing a mandatory

26. Id. at 531.
27. Id. at 555-56.
28. Id. at 531.
29. Id. at 550-53.
30. Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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retirement age on state judges.31 In 1992, the Court held
that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from
“commandeering” state legislatures—ordering them to enact
legislation to conform with federal policy.32 And in 1997, the
Court extended this anti-commandeering rule to state
executive officials.33
Further, the Court since 1995 has gone beyond its rerevival of the Tenth Amendment to hold on three occasions
that federal laws exceeded Congress’ power under the
Commerce Clause. In 1995, the Court struck down a statute
criminalizing gun possession in schools;34 and in 2000, it
struck down a federal damages remedy for victims of
gender-motivated violence.35 Most recently, in 2012, the
Court held that the “individual mandate” that was the
centerpiece of President Obama’s signature legislation, the
Affordable Care Act, could not be sustained as an exercise of
the commerce power.36 The individual mandate is a federal
requirement that individuals obtain health insurance or
else pay a penalty or tax with their returns to the Internal
Revenue Service;37 the provision is intended to force free
riders on the nation’s health care system to internalize their
costs.38
31. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-63 (1991). This holding was
based on a quasi-constitutional rule of statutory interpretation: the Court held
that because such an application of the federal law would raise constitutional
doubts, it would not so interpret the statute in the absence of a “clear
statement” of an intent to regulate high-level state policy-making employees,
such as judges. Id. at 460-61.
32. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992).
33. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
34. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1995).
35. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625-27 (2000).
36. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585-86 (2012).
The law was ultimately upheld as an exercise of the taxing power. See id. at
2598.
37. Id. at 2580.
38. The uninsured were seen by Congress as a group comprising either users
of free emergency room services to meet their medical needs or else health
insurance “market timers” trying to remain out of the fee-paying risk pool while
they are still young and relatively healthy. See id. at 2588-91.
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Few if any judges or commentators have seriously
argued (rhetorical flourishes aside) that the developments
since Garcia constitute a broad pendulum swing all the way
back to the non-deferential review of federalism boundaries
characteristic of the pre-1937 era. The amplitude of the
pendulum swing, if not becoming consistently smaller, is
generally trending smaller. For example, the Tenth
Amendment “revival” under National League of Cities was
quite limited compared to pre-1937 doctrine, since it applied
only to “traditional state governmental functions” rather
than extending to all intrastate activity by private actors as
well. And the “anti-commandeering” rule’s re-revival of
National League of Cities is narrower still: it prohibits
Congress from ordering state legislatures or executive
officials to carry out federal policies, but it does not overrule
Garcia. Under current doctrine, Congress can subject states
to “generally applicable” laws and thus, for example, require
states to pay their employees the federal minimum wage
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.39
Even the Commerce Clause decisions—despite their
occasional high profile—are relatively modest compared to
pre-1937 doctrine. The Court’s current doctrine continues to
hold that Congress can regulate any local economic activity
that, taken in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate
commerce.40 The Court’s recently-emphasized requirements
that the activity be “economic” and that it be “activity”
rather than “inactivity” still allow very broad legislative
jurisdiction to Congress. Indeed, as recently as 2005, the
Court upheld the application of the federal Controlled
Substances Act to the backyard cultivation and possession
of small amounts of medical marijuana that were legal
under California law.41
39. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Indeed, the Reno Court indicated that
“generally applicability” may not necessarily be a constitutional requirement of
federal regulation of state governmental activities, so long as Congress does not
commandeer the state by regulating the state’s regulation of private parties.
Reno, 528 U.S. 141.
40. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005).
41. Id. at 9.
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And yet the debate over the Court’s role can be
significant in important and high-profile cases, as the recent
“Obamacare” case illustrates. Although the individual
mandate was upheld as an exercise of the congressional
taxing power, the Court’s ruling that the mandate was not
authorized as commerce regulation could have significant
consequences by pushing Congress to rely on the tax system
rather than direct regulation when addressing other freerider problems in the national economy. And there remains
a pronounced debate on the Court and in the legal academy
about the degree of deference to be afforded to congressional
judgments on whether the definitional criteria (“economic
activity” and “substantial effects”) are met.
B. The Political Safeguards of Federalism
“The political safeguards of federalism” theory refers to
a set of arguments that U.S. political processes, both those
embedded in constitutional structures and extraconstitutional ones, sufficiently protect the states as
independent and relatively autonomous governmental
units, thereby making non-deferential judicial review of
federal legislation unnecessary to safeguard federalism.
Indeed, active judicial review in policing the boundaries of
federalism is counterproductive according to this argument,
because the courts are poorly positioned to accomplish this
task. Proponents of this view argue that there is an absence
of clear or principled constitutional limitations for the court
to apply in specific cases, whereas Congress and the
President are far more likely than the courts to be
politically sensitive to state concerns when necessary to
strike a balance between national versus local regulatory
solutions.42
The phrase “political safeguards of federalism” is
derived from a short but highly-influential article of that
name published by Professor Herbert Wechsler in 1954.43
Wechsler argued that “the national political process in the
42. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 1, at 175, 171-259 (1980); Kramer, supra
note 1, at 279.
43. Wechsler, supra note 1.
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United States—and especially the role of the states in the
composition and selection of the central government—is
intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new
intrusions by the center on the domain of the states.”44
Wechsler pointed in particular to structural protections of
states built into the composition of the political branches of
the federal government: equal representation of the states
in the Senate (protecting small states from national
majorities); selection of Senators and presidential electors
by state legislatures; and state control over federal election
procedures.45 These elements would keep both Congress and
the President attentive to state concerns and make vigorous
judicial review of federal-state legislative boundaries
unnecessary. “Federal intervention as against the states is
thus primarily a matter for congressional determination in
our system,” according to Wechsler.46 On the other hand,
“[t]he prime function envisaged for judicial review—in
relation to federalism—was the maintainance [sic] of
national supremacy against nullification or usurpation by
the individual states”—and not, significantly, the other way
around.47 “[T]he Court is on weakest ground when it opposes
its interpretation of the Constitution to that of Congress in
the interest of the states, whose representatives control the
legislative process . . . .”48
Wechsler’s argument, as elaborated by subsequent
scholars, was embraced and forcefully articulated thirty
years later by the Supreme Court in Garcia.49 The Court
first candidly acknowledged “doubt that courts ultimately
can identify principled constitutional limitations on the
scope of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers over the States
44. Id. at 558.
45. Id. at 546-50.
46. Id. at 559.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See generally Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
551 n.11 (1985). In addition to Wechsler’s article, the Court cited CHOPER, supra
note 1, and D. Bruce La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux:
Intergovernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 WASH.
U. L.Q. 779 (1982). Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 n.11.
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merely by relying on a priori definitions of state
sovereignty.”50 Moreover, “[w]ith rare exceptions . . . the
Constitution does not carve out express elements of state
sovereignty that Congress may not employ its delegated
powers to displace.”51 Therefore, the Court has “no license to
employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when
measuring congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause.”52 Instead:
[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of
the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the
Federal Government itself. . . . [which was] designed in large part
to protect the States from overreaching by Congress. The Framers
thus gave the States a role in the selection both of the Executive
and the Legislative Branches of the Federal Government. The
States were vested with indirect influence over the House of
Representatives and the Presidency by their control of electoral
qualifications and their role in Presidential elections. They were
given more direct influence in the Senate, where each State
received equal representation and each Senator was to be selected
by the legislature of his State. The significance attached to the
States’ equal representation in the Senate is underscored by the
prohibition of any constitutional amendment divesting a State of
53
equal representation without the State’s consent.

The Court next argued that these political structures
reflected the Framers’ intent to protect federalism
politically rather than judicially.54 The Court then proceeded
to consider practical political safeguards:
The effectiveness of the federal political process in preserving the
States’ interests is apparent even today in the course of federal
legislation. On the one hand, the States have been able to direct a
substantial proportion of federal revenues into their own
treasuries in the form of general and program-specific grants in
aid. The federal role in assisting state and local governments is a
longstanding one . . . . Moreover, at the same time that the States
have exercised their influence to obtain federal support, they have

50. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548.
51. Id. at 550.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 550-51 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 551-52.
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been able to exempt themselves from a wide variety of obligations
55
imposed by Congress under the Commerce Clause.

The Court concluded:
We realize that changes in the structure of the Federal
Government have taken place since 1789, not the least of which
has been the substitution of popular election of Senators by the
adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, and that these
changes may work to alter the influence of the States in the
federal political process. Nonetheless, against this background, we
are convinced that the fundamental limitation that the
constitutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect
the “States as States” is one of process rather than one of result.
Any substantive restraint on the exercise of Commerce Clause
powers must find its justification in the procedural nature of this
basic limitation, and it must be tailored to compensate for possible
failings in the national political process rather than to dictate a
56
“sacred province of state autonomy.”

The Garcia majority embraced this theory while
considering a federal law regulating the states rather than
strictly private activity, but the rationale applies to
interpretation of the Commerce Clause generally. It has
been so understood by Justices since Garcia.57 At the same
time, Garcia’s embrace of the theory has not embedded the
political safeguards theory as doctrine. The majorities in
Lopez, Morrison, and National Federation of Independent
Businesses largely ignored the argument, and their legal
conclusions—based as they are on non-deferential review—
are necessarily incompatible with it.
The “political safeguards of federalism” theory came
under some academic criticism after Garcia.58 The gist of the
critics’ argument is that the structures emphasized by
Wechsler and the Garcia Court—state representation in the
Senate and the Electoral College and state control over
congressional districts and voting qualifications—simply do
55. Id. at 552-53 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 554 (footnote omitted).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 649-50 (2000) (Souter,
J., dissenting).
58. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 1; Marshall, supra note 1; Prakash & Yoo,
supra note 1; Yoo, supra note 1.
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not function to protect state interests. The Framers’ original
design in which state legislatures had substantial roles in
choosing Senators and electors has been supplanted by
direct election of Senators and binding popular-vote
selection of presidential electors.59 Moreover, as
acknowledged even by Professor Larry Kramer—who
ultimately supported Wechsler’s argument—sensitivity of
Senators and Congressmen to their home constituencies
does not necessarily translate into protectiveness of state
institutions, insofar as home constituencies’ policy
preferences could well accord with broad federal laws that
preempt state law policy choices.60
C. Kramer’s Revision of “Political Safeguards” and the
Electoral College
These weaknesses of the political safeguards theory
were persuasively addressed in a 2000 article by Professor
Larry Kramer, who concluded that:
Rather than the formal constitutional structures highlighted in
Wechsler’s original analysis, federalism in the United States has
been safeguarded by a complex system of informal political
institutions . . . . The basic intuition of Wechsler’s pathbreaking
article thus remains sound, even if the reasons for its vitality are
61
not those offered by Professor Wechsler himself.

Wechsler’s basic insight was simple: despite seventeen
years (as of 1954) of highly deferential judicial review of
federalism limitations on congressional power, the
continued existence of the states as autonomous political
units remained strong; therefore, something other than
judicial policing of those limits had to explain the
phenomenon.62 Kramer developed this point further. The
practical extent and impact of judicial enforcement of
federalism, even in its pre-1937 heyday, had been greatly
exaggerated, according to Kramer. Therefore, the non59. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 224-26.
60. See id. at 222-23.
61. Id. at 219.
62. See Wechsler, supra note 1, at 558-60.

2014] PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS & FEDERALISM

615

judicial safeguards of state independence must necessarily
be even stronger than otherwise.63
Kramer’s most significant addition to the “political
safeguards of federalism” was to argue that the main
protection of state autonomy is party politics. Large and
decentralized, the two major political parties depend heavily
on cooperation between the national and local levels. Even
presidential campaigns rely to a great degree on local party
organizations to perform door-to-door canvassing and getout-the-vote efforts. State political offices and parties are
also career incubators for those who seek national elective
office. Aside from political party structures, state officials
conduct extensive lobbying efforts at the federal level.
Finally, many federal programs are entirely dependent on
state bureaucracies for implementation.64 With these
specifics, Kramer persuasively elaborates on the more
general insight expressed by Wechsler; that as a matter of
U.S. political culture and traditions, the continued existence
of autonomous state institutions is assumed and relied
upon.65
Thorough and persuasive as Kramer’s treatment is, he
gives surprisingly short shrift to presidential politics and
the Electoral College as an additional element of the
political safeguards of federalism. He devotes a cursory two
paragraphs to the subject in an eighty-plus page article and
dismissively concludes: “insofar as we are concerned with
protecting the integrity and authority of state political
institutions, it is hard to see that the Electoral College helps
or matters much.”66
Kramer overlooks the potential of the Electoral College
for safeguarding federalism because he limits his
consideration of the issue to an evaluation of Wechsler’s
flawed argument on this point. For Wechsler, the Electoral
College embodied a protection of state institutional interests
because, in the framer’s original design, electors were to be
63. Kramer, supra note 1, at 290.
64. See id. at 283-84 & n.269.
65. See id. at 227; Wechsler, supra note 1, at 545.
66. Kramer, supra note 1, at 225-26.
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chosen by state legislatures and were therefore beholden to
them.67 But unless the political safeguards argument were
limited strictly to one of the Framer’s original intent—
which it manifestly is not—then Wechsler’s argument bears
little relation to practical realities. As Kramer observed,
“the emergence of the popular canvass and winner-take-all
rule,” by which electors are bound to vote for the candidate
chosen by the majority or plurality of the state’s popular
vote, eliminated any role the state legislatures may once
have had in presidential selection—a point that was true for
a century before Wechsler’s 1954 article.68 Kramer does
acknowledge that the Electoral College “still affects
presidential campaigns, of course, by forcing candidates to
look for votes in enough states to win a majority of the
electors.”69 But he fails to see how this might affect
federalism, since he assumes—wrongly—that presidential
candidates will seek these votes only by advocating
affirmative nationwide policies that will appeal to the voters
in some majority coalition of states.
Earlier in the article, Kramer makes what he deems an
“enormously” important distinction between “geographically
narrow interests” of the voters within a state, and “the
governance prerogatives of state and local institutions.”70 As
Kramer sensibly points out, federalism is not protected
when Congress adopts a national regulatory regime simply
because the regime may appeal to the geographically
defined preferences of voters of some states but not others.71
Such a regime must be borne by the entire nation, whereas
federalism is a means of “assuring that federal
policymakers leave suitable decisions to be made in the first
instance by state politicians in state institutions.”72
67. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 552-58.
68. Kramer, supra note 1, at 225; see Matthew M. Hoffman, The Illegitimate
President: Minority Vote Dilution and the Electoral College, 105 YALE L.J. 935,
946 (1996) (winner-take-all system of Electoral College was predominant
throughout the states by 1832).
69. Kramer, supra note 1, at 225.
70. Id. at 222.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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But the interests/institutions distinction is not nearly so
clear-cut as Kramer suggests: the geographically narrow
interests of state voters will often be embodied in the
governance prerogatives of state institutions. Where the
state voters make a salient policy choice—to legalize
marijuana or to recognize same-sex marriage, for example—
a federal decision to leave the policy determination to the
states will indeed protect federalism as Kramer (correctly)
defines it. As will be elaborated further below, the Obama
Administration’s decision to dial back enforcement of the
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) against persons complying
with state law is just such a federalism-protective policy.
Thus, Kramer’s distinction between “interests” and
“institutions” is only partially correct. It is more accurate in
the federalism context to distinguish between federal
policies based on their preemptive impact rather than on
the geographical scope of the interests that motivate them.
Federal policies that preempt state law, even if intended to
appeal to the voters of some states at the expense of others,
tend to undermine state policy-making institutions; policies
that preserve state law, whatever their motivation, tend to
protect those state institutions.
In the end, both Wechsler and Kramer fail to see how a
key feature of the Electoral College system can protect
federalism. Both nod toward the requirement of an
Electoral College majority, but neither give any thought to
how it works in practice. The key feature is what
contemporary commentators often call “electoral math,” by
which they mean all the tactics and strategies used by a
presidential campaign to win the 270th electoral vote.73
Kramer mistakenly dismisses the whole idea from the
category of political safeguards of federalism by assuming
that presidential aspirants will seek votes by appealing to
“state interests” rather than “state institutions.” Both
Wechsler and Kramer fail to consider that a President is
elected not by building some abstract coalition of states
73. See, e.g., Nate Silver, Whistling Past Bubba, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Nov. 10, 2008), http://www.fivethirtyeight.com/2008/11/whistling-past-bubba.
html (providing historical context for the geographical and electoral vote-based
strategy of Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign).
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equaling or surpassing the required 270 electoral votes, but
by winning vote majorities or pluralities in some particular
grouping of fifty specific states with varying electoral
votes—and varying policy choices. Put another way, neither
Wechsler nor Kramer reflect on the concept of “battleground
states” or on the fact that key battleground states may have
salient policy choices that are on the national policy agenda
in a particular election cycle.
D. Recent Developments in the Political Safeguards Debate
More recent scholarship examining the question of
political versus judicial safeguards of federalism has
extended the analysis in greater detail to the executive
branch—though without considering presidential electoral
politics. Jessica Bulman-Pozen and Heather Gerken, for
example, have argued that the political safeguards debate is
largely irrelevant in a world where federal legislative power
is virtually all-encompassing; the real safeguards of
federalism stem not from efforts to protect state
“sovereignty,” but rather from states’ ability to interpret or
resist federal policies in implementing cooperative
federalism programs.74 One can argue over whether this
description of federal-state relations accurately captures
situations like drug criminalization, where federal and state
governments have enacted parallel regimes rather than a
regulatory regime that was vertically integrated by design.
By focusing on state resistance and the federal
government’s inability to control it as the primary
determinant of federalism, Bulman-Pozen and Gerken’s
account understates the degree to which the political system
might place direct influence on the federal executive to
refrain from engaging in preemptive federal regulation.
In a recent article, Robert Mikos focuses specifically on
the example of state marijuana legalization against a
backdrop of the CSA’s zero-tolerance policy.75 Mikos argues
74. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative
Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1282-83 (2009).
75. Robert A. Mikos, Preemption Under the Controlled Substances Act, 16 J.
HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 5 (2013).
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that under-enforcement of federal law can create leeway for
state policy experimentation.76 Federal under-enforcement
is a “political safeguard” because it stems from structural
factors operating within the political branches, primarily
resource allocation constraints. In the marijuana
legalization context, these constraints include limited
money to put agents on the ground and prosecute large
numbers of cases, as well as limited political support for
raising medical marijuana to a higher rank in the list of
federal enforcement priorities. Mikos’s account raises a
critical point, but overlooks another one. Underenforcement in his account is a side effect of federal
resource constraints combined with a generalized
sensitivity to nationwide public opinion. But Mikos does not
adequately consider how conscious policy decisions about
enforcement priorities—decisions emanating from the
President or top officials—might themselves drive underenforcement of the federal marijuana prohibition. The
Obama Administration’s conscious policy statements and
positions on marijuana legalization suggest that the
marijuana legalization story has more to do with the
President’s political responsiveness to state autonomy on
this issue than the resource constraint story gives credit for.
II. MARIJUANA: STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATORY REGIMES
Since 1996, marijuana regulation has emerged as one of
the most complex regulatory problems in the history of
federalism. This issue starkly illustrates the challenges that
can be raised by a federal regulatory regime that
contradicts state laws. Under the federal Controlled
Substances Act (CSA),77 possession or use of marijuana for
any purpose is flatly prohibited. But as of early 2014, the
laws of twenty states plus the District of Columbia have
enacted some form of legalization of marijuana—in most of
these states for medicinal uses only.78 The combination of a
76. See id. at 5-9.
77. 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904 (2012).
78. Medical Use, supra note 4 (follow hyperlinks for Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, District of Columbia, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Montana, Nevada, and Oregon) (ballot initiatives); id. (follow hyperlinks for
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federal regime restricting personal liberty coupled with a
number of pro-liberty regimes at the state level arguably
has not been seen in the United States to this degree since
the conflict between state personal liberty laws and the
federal Fugitive Slave Acts before the Civil War.79
In addition to the federalism question, the subject of
marijuana legalization raises a challenging question of
separation of powers. The President’s duty to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed”80 both imposes an
obligation to enforce the law and affords discretion in how
and how much to enforce the law. President Obama
undoubtedly, albeit somewhat equivocally, departed from
the near “zero tolerance” policy of his predecessor toward
medical marijuana, adding another layer of complexity to
the current regime of marijuana regulation.81

Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington) (legislative acts).
79. See, e.g., Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Supreme Court and Congress’s
Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights: An Overlooked Moral Anomaly, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 153, 197-98 (2004) (describing federalism conflict between
state personal liberty and federal fugitive slave laws).
80. U.S. Const. art. II, § 3.
81. The Bush Administration adopted something like an official “zero
tolerance” policy toward medical marijuana dispensaries by prosecuting
dispensaries irrespective of their compliance with state law. In contrast, the
Obama Administration focused enforcement efforts on dispensaries that were
out of compliance with state law. See, e.g., In First 100 Days, Obama Flips Bush
Admin’s Policies, ABC NEWS (Apr. 29, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/Obama100days/story?id=7042171. Apparently, federal authorities in the
Bush years did not fully press criminal enforcement efforts against individual
medical marijuana users. See Stuart S. Taylor, Jr., Marijuana Policy and
Presidential Leadership: How to Avoid a Federal-State Train Wreck,
GOVERNANCE STUD. BROOKINGS, Apr. 2013, at 20-21, http://www.brookings.
edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/04/11%20marijuana%20legalization%20
taylor/marijuana%20policy%20and%20presidential%20leadership_v27.pdf. The
Raich case, in which federal authorities raided the home of a medical marijuana
user to destroy a small number of plants and then litigated the issue to the
Supreme Court, demonstrated the Bush Administration’s interest in publicizing,
at least symbolically, something like a zero tolerance policy toward medical
marijuana.
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A. State Marijuana Legalization
Prior to 1996, the laws of all fifty states made criminal
offenses of marijuana possession and distribution, similar to
federal law.82 But starting with California’s enactment of its
Compassionate Use Act by referendum in 1996, twenty
states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that
remove criminal penalties for the possession, use, and
cultivation of marijuana for medical purposes.83 Two of
these states, Colorado and Washington, have legalized
“recreational” marijuana, but impose state controls akin to
the more restrictive state laws regulating sale of alcoholic
beverages.84 These laws include both statutes and

82. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 5 (“In 1913, California was one of the
first States to prohibit the sale and possession of marijuana, and [in 1996],
California became the first State to authorize limited use of the drug for
medicinal purposes.”); Our History, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, http://www.mpp.
org/about/history.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2014) (prior to 1995, medical
marijuana was illegal in all 50 states).
83. See Medical Use, supra note 4. Maryland’s law is more limited than other
state laws: it provides an affirmative defense to criminal prosecution for
possession of marijuana if an individual possesses less than one ounce of
marijuana and was diagnosed with a debilitating medical condition by his or her
regular physician. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 5-601(c)(3)(iii) (West 2012).
84. Colorado and Washington have treated the regulation of marijuana
similarly to how states regulate alcohol. Colorado’s Constitution was amended
to allow for the “use of marijuana should be legal for persons twenty-one years
of age or older and taxed in a manner similar to alcohol.” COLO. CONST. art.
XVIII, § 16. Colorado’s constitution goes on to say “marijuana should be
regulated in a manner similar to alcohol.” Id.; see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-18406 (2013). In Washington, the Washington State Liquor Control Board will
oversee the enforcement of the enacted marijuana regulations. WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 46.61.502, 69.50.360-366, 413, 435 (2012). Both state laws have restrictions
on age to use and buy marijuana as well as driving while under the influence of
marijuana and public use restrictions. See Colorado Laws & Penalties, NORML,
http://norml.org/laws/item/colorado-penalties (last visited Feb. 15, 2014);
Washington Laws & Penalties, NORML, http://norml.org/laws/item/washingtonpenalties-2 (last visited Feb. 15, 2014); see also Colorado and Washington’s New
Approaches to Marijuana Policy, An Overview of Each State’s Framework for
Regulating Marijuana Similarly to Alcohol, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT,
http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/COWAGrid.pdf (last visited Mar. 19,
2014).
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constitutional provisions and were enacted by state ballot
initiatives or the states’ legislative processes.85
State medical marijuana laws shield patients, doctors,
caregivers, and (in some states) even dispensaries from
arrest and state criminal drug prosecution under certain
authorized conditions.86 The state laws vary in details, such
as the amounts that can be lawfully possessed, the health
conditions that qualify for medical marijuana use, the
required role of physicians, and other matters.87 Other
common provisions among state laws include delegating
administration of the law to the state health agency,88
establishing confidential, state-run patient registries,89 and
requiring a written prescription from a physician.90 Several

85. Medical Use, supra note 4 (follow hyperlinks for Arizona, District of
Columbia, California, Colorado, Michigan, Montana, and Nevada) (ballot
initiatives); id. (follow hyperlinks for Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Vermont) (legislative acts).
86. See, e.g., Delaware Medical Marijuana Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §
4903A (West 2013).
87. Some state laws require that patients try conventional medical therapy
before they can obtain medical marijuana prescriptions, e.g., Maine Medical Use
of Marijuana Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2422(2)(B) (West Supp. 2013);
Washington State Medical Use of Cannabis Act, WASH. REV. CODE §
69.51A.010(6)(b)-(f) (2012), while others simply provide a list of pre-approved
conditions for which medical marijuana can be prescribed. See, e.g., CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.7(h) (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 329-121
(2010). Some states authorize medical marijuana prescriptions for a large
variety of medical conditions, while others exercise tighter control over its
acceptable use. Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.7(h) (West 2007)
(broad list plus catchall provision), with MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-302(2)(c)
(2013) (limiting conditions to those involving chronic pain). See also ALASKA
STAT. §§ 17.37.010(a), (d), (e) (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2801(5) (2013)
(caregiver provisions); Medical Use, supra note 4 (follow hyperlinks to Vermont,
Alaska, Maine, Nevada, Hawaii, New Mexico, California, Oregon, Colorado, and
Montana) (regulating permissible amounts of marijuana in possession).
88. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 14; ME. REV. STAT. tit. 22, §§ 24212430 (West Supp. 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24:6I-1, 24:6I-16 (West Supp. 2013).
89. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 17.37.01 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§
4908A-4912A, 4920A (West 2013); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-303 (2013).
90. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 453A.170 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 21-28.63(15) (Supp. 2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4473(b)(2) (2012).
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states have mandated government oversight of medical
marijuana dispensaries.91
B. Federal Law and Policy on Marijuana
1. The Controlled Substances Act. The CSA lists
marijuana as a “schedule I” drug on its system of drug
regulation.92 The four schedules in the CSA purport to rank
drugs by their levels of dangerousness, addictiveness, and
medical utility.93 While drugs listed on schedules II through
IV can be prescribed by physicians subject to certain
restrictions, schedule I drugs are defined as those having “a
high potential for abuse” and “no currently accepted medical
use in treatment in the United States.”94 The CSA thus
makes the manufacture, distribution, or possession of
marijuana a criminal offense.95 Simple possession of small
amounts of marijuana is a misdemeanor, and possession of
larger amounts, possession with intent to distribute,
distribution, or manufacture of marijuana are felonies
carrying variously severe penalties.96
Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,
Article VI, Clause 2, federal laws are “the supreme law of
the land” and as a general matter trump state laws where
the two come into conflict. Under this principle, known as
federal “preemption” of state law, state laws cannot
supersede federal laws. In the particular case of marijuana
regulation, the possession, use, or distribution of marijuana
remains illegal throughout the United States from the
vantage point of individuals, even where permissible under
91. See Delaware: Federal Threats Halt Efforts to Implement State’s
Medicinal Cannabis Law, NORML (Feb. 16, 2012), http://norml.org/news/
2012/02/16/delaware-federal-threats-halt-efforts-to-implement-state-s-medicinal
-cannabis-law.
92. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) Schedule I(c) (2012) (Tetrahydrocannabinols).
93. § 812(b) (2012).
94. § 812(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2012).
95. §§ 823(f), 841(a)(1), 844(a). Federal law does allow schedule I drugs to be
used as part of a Food and Drug Administration pre-approved research study.
§ 823(f).
96. §§ 841-844.
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state law.97 State legalization of medical or recreational
marijuana means that state authorities and courts will not
arrest and prosecute marijuana cases to the extent legalized
under state law.98 Yet these same activities remain subject
to criminal sanctions initiated by federal authorities in
federal courts under the CSA.
For individuals whose concern is to obey all drug laws,
then, state legalization does not change the marijuana
regulatory regime. But for those whose concern is avoid
criminal arrest and prosecution, the practical impact of
state legalization is quite significant. This is the result of
the simple fact that federal law enforcement resources are
quite small relative to those of the states.99 Moreover, if the
federal government systematically places a low priority on
devoting investigative and prosecutorial resources to
legalized marijuana, a state legalization regime can create
an environment of de facto legalization. Something like this
seems to be the case in states like Colorado, California, and
Washington, at least for medical marijuana.100
97. §§ 841-844 (2012).
98. See David S. Schwartz, High Federalism: Marijuana Legalization and the
Limits of Federal Power to Regulate States, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 567, 576, 581-90
(2013).
99. There are at present approximately 120,000 federal law enforcement
agents in the United States, compared to 765,000 at the state level. Federal Law
Enforcement
Officers,
2008,
BUREAU
JUST.
STAT.
(June
2012),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fleo08.pdf. (“In September 2008, federal
agencies employed approximately 120,000 full-time law enforcement officers
who were authorized to make arrests and carry firearms in the United States.”);
Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008, BUREAU JUST. STAT.
(July 2011), http://bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=2216 (“State and local law
enforcement agencies employed about 1,133,000 persons on a full-time basis in
2008, including 765,000 sworn personnel.”). Professor Mikos reports that “only 1
percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases generated every year are
handled by federal authorities.” Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy:
Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime,
62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1424 & n.10 (2009) (citing FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES (2007)).
100. See Matt Ferner, Amendment 64 Passes: Colorado Legalizes Marijuana
for Recreational Use, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 20, 2012, 12:45 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/06/amendment-64-passes-in-co_n_20798
99.html; Jacob Sullum, If Medical Marijuana in California Is De Facto
Legalization, Why Not Make it Official?, FORBES (Nov. 18, 2013, 11:35 AM),
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To be sure, neither Congress nor the executive branch
have taken formal steps to accommodate state policies
legalizing medical marijuana. Congress can, but has not,
amended the Controlled Substances Act either to remove
marijuana from schedule I (drugs prohibited for all
purposes) or to provide for waivers of federal enforcement in
states where marijuana is legal. As for the executive
branch, the CSA authorizes the Attorney General to follow
specified procedures that would result in rescheduling
marijuana from schedule I to a lesser schedule that would
permit medical prescription of the drug;101 no attorney
general has done so. But in contrast to the judicial
safeguards of federalism, which can only operate through
formal judicial acts, the political safeguards of federalism
can operate informally. And that seems to have occurred in
the case of state marijuana legalization.
2. The Obama Administration’s Policy. As a presidential
candidate in 2008, Barack Obama said that an Obama
Administration would stop DEA raids on providers of
medical marijuana who were complying with state
compassionate use laws.102 As President, Obama followed
this policy—to a degree.
As a matter of constitutional law, the President’s duty
to “take care the laws be faithfully executed” would seem to
preclude a power to disregard an act of Congress based on a
policy disagreement with the statute. On the other hand,
the duty of the President to enforce a law he deems
unconstitutional is a matter of some dispute.103 A credible
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobsullum/2013/11/18/if-medical-marijuana-incalifornia-is-de-facto-legalization-why-not-make-it-official.
101. 21 U.S.C. § 811(a)(1)-(2).
102. John Tierney, Obama to Stop Raids on Marijuana Clinics, N.Y. TIMES
(May 14, 2008), http://tierneylab.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/obama-to-stopraids-on-marijuana-clinics.
103. Compare President Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, July 10, 1832, in 2 A
COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, 576
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897) (supporting Jackson’s veto of the Recharter of
the Bank of the United States); and Memorandum from Walter Dellinger,
Assistant Attorney General, on Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute
Unconstitutional Statutes to The Honorable Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the
President (Nov. 2, 1994), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm
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argument was made in 2005 in Gonzales v. Raich that the
commerce power could not sustain the application of the
CSA to users, suppliers, and possessors of small amounts of
marijuana grown intrastate and used in compliance with
state medical marijuana law. The fact that three Justices
agreed with that argument might well have leant credibility
to a presidential claim that the CSA was not constitutional
as applied to medical marijuana.104 Nevertheless, even
assuming President Obama would have disagreed with the
Raich conclusion, staking out a stark constitutional position
on the CSA as applied to medical marijuana, particularly
one flouting a Supreme Court decision, would have been a
politically risky move.
Far safer ground for his stated policy was reliance on
the virtually unreviewable discretion of the executive to
make prosecutorial resource allocation decisions.105 The
Obama Administration’s policy in this regard was initially
laid out in an October 19, 2009 memo from Deputy Attorney
General David Ogden, entitled “Investigations and
Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of
Marijuana.”106 While reaffirming the Justice Department’s
“commitment to the enforcement of the Controlled
Substances Act in all States,” the Ogden memo suggested
that “[t]he Department is also committed to making
(noting that issue raises “difficult questions” but concluding that “there are
circumstances” where the President has such authority), with Lear Siegler, Inc.
v. Lehman, 842 F.2d 1102 (9th Cir. 1988), withdrawn in part en banc, 893 F.2d
205 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The executive branch’s attempt to arrogate to itself the
power of judicial review is a paradigmatic violation of our system of separation
of powers and checks and balances.”); and LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 729-30 (3d ed. 2000) (concluding the same and citing Lear
Siegler case).
104. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 42 (2005) (O’Connor, J., Rehnquist, J., and
Thomas, J., dissenting).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“The
Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain ‘broad discretion’ to
enforce the Nation’s criminal laws.”).
106. The Department of Justice, Memorandum for Selected United State
Attorneys on Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical
Use of Marijuana, JUST. BLOG (Oct. 19, 2009), http://blogs.justice.gov/main/
archives/192.
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efficient and rational use of its limited investigative and
prosecutorial resources.”107 Noting federal prosecutors are
“vested with . . . the broadest discretion in the exercise of
[their authority over criminal matters]” the memo stated:
The prosecution of significant traffickers of illegal drugs,
including marijuana, and the disruption of illegal drug
manufacturing and trafficking networks continues to be a core
priority in the Department’s efforts against narcotics and
dangerous drugs, and the Department’s investigative and
prosecutorial resources should be directed towards these
objectives. As a general matter, pursuit of these priorities should
not focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose
actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing
state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana. For
example, prosecution of individuals with cancer or other serious
illnesses who use marijuana as part of a recommended treatment
regimen consistent with applicable state law, or those caregivers
in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state law who
provide such individuals with marijuana, is unlikely to be an
efficient use of limited federal resources. On the other hand,
prosecution of commercial enterprises that unlawfully market and
sell marijuana for profit continues to be an enforcement priority of
the Department.108

After listing several factors indicative of non-compliance
with state laws, such as threats of violence or distribution to
minors, the memo backtracked a bit:
Of course, no State can authorize violations of federal law . . . .
This guidance regarding resource allocation does not “legalize”
marijuana or provide a legal defense to a violation of federal law,
nor is it intended to create any privileges, benefits, or rights . . . .
Nor does clear and unambiguous compliance with state law or the
absence of one or all of the above factors create a legal defense to a
violation of the Controlled Substances Act. Rather, this
memorandum is intended solely as a guide to the exercise of
investigative and prosecutorial discretion.
Finally, nothing herein precludes investigation or prosecution
where there is a reasonable basis to believe that compliance with
state law is being invoked as a pretext for the production or
distribution of marijuana for purposes not authorized by state
law. Nor does this guidance preclude investigation or prosecution,
107. Id.
108. Id.
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even when there is clear and unambiguous compliance with
existing state law, in particular circumstances where
investigation or prosecution otherwise serves important federal
interests.
Your offices should continue to review marijuana cases for
109
prosecution on a case-by-case basis . . . .

To be sure, this policy guidance creates a complicated
picture due to the variation in state laws. For example,
while Colorado and California laws authorized the
operation of medical marijuana sales by storefront
dispensaries, Oregon law permitted possession and use of
medical marijuana, but not sales. Accordingly, the Oregon
U.S. Attorney’s office issued cease and desist letters to
dispensaries in that state.110
In 2011, medical marijuana advocates began publicizing
what they claimed to be a notable increase in investigations,
raids, and prosecutions of medical marijuana distributors in
various
states,
charging
President
Obama
with
backtracking on the Ogden memo and “betrayal” of his 2008
campaign promise.111 By 2012, some advocates claimed that
the number of medical marijuana prosecutions exceeded the
level of prosecutorial activity that took place under the
Bush Administration, notwithstanding the latter’s near
“zero tolerance” policy.112 President Obama responded to
questions about this in an April 2012 interview in Rolling
Stone magazine:
109. Id.
110. See Dwight C. Holton, U.S. Attorney, District of Oregon, Notice to
Owners, Operators and Landlords of Oregon Marijuana Dispensaries (June 3,
2011), http://www.calmca.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/OregonDOJwarnsPot
Advocates.pdf.
111. See, e.g., Todd Grabarsky, Conflicting Federal and State Medical
Marijuana Policies: A Threat to Cooperative Federalism, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 1,
16-18 (2013); William Yardley, New Federal Crackdown Confounds States that
Allow Medical Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2011, at A13; Feds Under Obama
Appear Tougher On Medical Marijuana, Disappointing Voters, FOX NEWS (Apr.
27, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/04/26/obama-still-unclear-onmedical-marijuana.
112. See, e.g., Tim Dickinson, Obama’s War on Pot, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 1,
2012, at 32, 32-35; see also supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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Here’s what’s up: What I specifically said was that we were not
going to prioritize prosecutions of persons who are using medical
marijuana. I never made a commitment that somehow we were
going to give carte blanche to large-scale producers and operators
of marijuana—and the reason is, because it’s against federal law. I
can’t nullify congressional law. I can’t ask the Justice Department
to say, ‘Ignore completely a federal law that’s on the books.’ What
I can say is, ‘Use your prosecutorial discretion and properly
prioritize your resources to go after things that are really doing
folks damage.’ As a consequence, there haven’t been prosecutions
of users of marijuana for medical purposes.
The only tension that’s come up—and this gets hyped up a lot—is
a murky area where you have large-scale, commercial operations
that may supply medical marijuana users, but in some cases may
also be supplying recreational users. In that situation, we put the
Justice Department in a very difficult place if we’re telling them,
‘This is supposed to be against the law, but we want you to turn
the other way.’ That’s not something we’re going to do.113

It is important, however, to see through the political
rhetoric of both President Obama and the marijuana
legalization advocates. Both had an incentive to exaggerate
the extent of CSA enforcement: the legalization advocates in
hopes of shaming the President into a posture of increased
permissiveness, and the President to continue walking a
tightrope between courting marijuana legalization
proponents and avoiding “soft-on-crime” attacks on his
flank. What may be lost underneath the rhetoric is the
subtlety of the Administration’s enforcement approach that
has relied heavily on “cease and desist” or “threat letters.”114
If the intent of federal authorities were to maximize the
deterrent effect of the CSA, the best approach would be to
make random unannounced raids on dispensaries in the
hope of scaring off those not actually raided. But a policy of
sending a warning before making a raid has an antideterrent effect: it creates a safe harbor, in essence
113. Jann S. Wenner, Ready for the Fight, ROLLING STONE, May 10, 2012, at
42, 42-49.
114. See, e.g., Bob Young, DEA: Warning Letters to 11 Pot Dispensaries Don’t
Signal War on State Law, SEATTLE TIMES (May 2, 2013, 5:54 AM),
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2020902577_potdispensariesxml.html.
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signaling marijuana distributors that they will not be
raided if they have not received a threat letter. The policy
allowed storefront medical marijuana dispensaries to
continue to operate in large numbers in Colorado,115 which
provides the most detailed regulatory scheme.116
In the aftermath of the 2012 election, moreover, the
Obama Administration seems to have returned to a more
overtly low-key enforcement approach. Most notably, the
policy of the 2009 Ogden memo was extended in late August
2013 to the “recreational use” laws recently enacted in
Washington and Colorado. In a Memorandum for all U.S.
Attorneys, the Justice Department expressed its
“commit[ment] to using its limited investigative and
prosecutorial resources to address the most significant
threats” posed by distribution of marijuana by gangs or
cartels, while leaving “lower-level or localized activity” to
state and local law enforcement under state drug laws.117
115. See John Ingold, Colorado Medical-Marijuana Business Have Declined by
40 Percent, DENVER POST (Mar. 3, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.denverpost.com
/ci_22706453/colorado-medical-marijuana-businesses-have-declined.
For
a
detailed history of the change in federal enforcement policy towards medical
marijuana, see Federal Enforcement Policy De-Prioritizing Medical Marijuana:
Statements from Pres. Obama, His Spokesman, and the Justice Department,
MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Mar. 2013), http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/
library/Federal-Enforcement-Policy-De-Prioritizing-Medical-Marijuana.pdf.
116. For Colorado’s rules regarding the licensing, regulations, and sale of
recreational marijuana, see COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-2 (2013), available at
http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application%a
2Fpdf&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobwhere=1251857416241&ssbina
ry=true.
117. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, on Guidance Regarding Marijuana Related Financial Crimes to All
United States Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf. Federal priorities were expressly
identified as:
Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; Preventing revenue
from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs,
and cartels; Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it
is legal under state law in some form to other states; Preventing stateauthorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for
the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; Preventing
violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation and distribution of
marijuana; Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other

2014] PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS & FEDERALISM

631

In jurisdictions that have enacted laws legalizing marijuana in
some form and that have also implemented strong and effective
regulatory and enforcement systems to control the cultivation,
distribution, sale, and possession of marijuana, conduct in
compliance with those laws and regulations is less likely to
threaten the federal priorities set forth above. Indeed, a robust
system may affirmatively address those priorities by, for example,
implementing effective measures to prevent diversion of
marijuana outside the regulated system and to other states,
prohibiting access to marijuana by minors, and replacing an illicit
marijuana trade that funds criminal enterprises with a tightly
regulated market in which revenues are tracked and accounted
for. In those circumstances, consistent with the traditional
allocation of federal-state efforts in this area, enforcement of state
law by state and local law enforcement and regulatory bodies
should remain the primary means of addressing marijuanarelated activity.118

The memo goes on to assert that the policy guidance is
not a legal defense to any marijuana prosecution nor a limit
on the authority of the federal government to enforce the
CSA fully; instead, the memo states that it is merely a guide
to prosecutorial discretion and that U.S. Attorneys should
review potential prosecutions on a case-by-case basis.119
III. MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
Two trends in U.S. politics have emerged since the end
of the 1990s that are central to my argument that
presidential politics filtered through the Electoral College
can be a significant political safeguard of federalism. As
noted, states began enacting laws legalizing marijuana first
for medicinal purposes, and more recently for recreational
purposes, beginning in 1996. In that same time frame, the
past four presidential election cycles have produced closer
adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use;
Preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the attendant
public safety and environmental dangers posed by marijuana
production on public land; and Preventing marijuana possession or use
on federal property.
Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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A. Marijuana States and the Electoral College
My thesis is that the Electoral College will tend to
protect federalism when a grouping of “swing states” has a
salient policy preference that is inconsistent with a wellsupported national policy alternative—at least where the
next presidential race is expected to be close. By “swing
states,” I mean those states that are potentially important
difference-makers in a close election. A premise of my
argument is that any tendency of “electoral math” to protect
federalism will be most pronounced in close elections; where
presidential campaigns (or incumbent presidents thinking
ahead to re-election) expect a landslide, it is far less likely
that they will tailor their actions or messages to particular
states.
The electoral importance of the medical marijuana
states is readily apparent from an analysis of their Electoral
College characteristics, presented in Table 1. As noted
above, twenty states plus the District of Columbia (which
casts three electoral votes) have legalized medical
marijuana, and two of these states have recently legalized
“recreational” marijuana as well. Table 1 lists the twenty
states and D.C., the year each adopted its medical
marijuana legalization regime, and its electoral vote count
in each cycle. Together, these states accounted for 187 to
190 electoral votes in the last four election cycles.120 The
next group of columns shows the popular vote differential
for the state in each election cycle. Dark gray shading
indicates that Republican, and light gray shading indicates
that Democratic candidates won the state. As indicated by
the shading, these states are overwhelmingly Democratic in
120. The 2000 electoral vote totals are based on the 1990 census; the 2004 and
2008 totals are based on the 2000 census; and the 2012 totals are based on the
2010 census. See Congressional Apportionment, CENSUS.GOV (Nov. 2011),
http://www.census.gov/population/apportionment/data/2010_apportionment_res
ults.html. For all electoral data and presidential election results, see DAVE
LEIP’S ATLAS U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, http://uselectionatlas.org/RESULTS
(last visited Mar. 23, 2014).
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their voting, accounting for between 155 and 174 electoral
votes in the Democratic column.
Electoral Votes

Margin of Victory by %

State

Year
MJ
Legal

'00

'04, '08

'12

'00

'04

'08

'12

Alaska

1998

3

3

3

31

26

22

14

Arizona

2010

8

10

11

6

10

8

9

California

1996

54

55

55

12

10

24

23

Colorado

2000

8

9

9

8

5

9

5

Connecticut

2012

8

7

7

17

10

22

17

Delaware

2011

2*

3

3

13

8

25

19

Dist. Columbia

2010

3

3

3

76

80

86

84

Hawaii

1998

4

4

4

18

9

45

43

Maine

1999

4

4

4

5

9

17

15

Maryland

2003

10

10

10

16

13

25

26

Massachusetts

2012

12

12

11

27

25

26

23

Michigan

2008

18

17

16

5

3

16

9

Montana

2004

3

3

3

25

21

2

14

Nevada

2000

4

5

6

4

3

12

7

New Jersey

2010

15

15

14

16

7

16

18

New Mexico

2007

5

5

5

0

1

15

10

Oregon

1998

7

7

7

0

4

16

12

Rhode Island

2006

4

4

4

29

21

28

27

Vermont

2004

3

3

3

10

20

37

36

Washington

1998

6

7

17

15

11

11

12

Total

186

190

190

Total Rep.

26

35, 16

Total Dem.
160 155, 174
* One electoral vote withheld in abstention.

17
173

Table 1: Electoral Votes and Presidential Victory Margins in
(Medical) Marijuana Legalization States

On closer analysis, however, the great majority of these
states should be viewed as swing states. I propose four
measures to suggest that a state is a swing state, or would
be perceived to be one by a presidential campaign under the
electoral demographic trends since 2000. These are
indicated in Table 2. The first borrows Nate Silver’s
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definition of a “tipping point” state (NS-TP).121 Silver defines
a tipping point state as one likely to provide the 270th (i.e.,
the winning) electoral vote in a given election.122 To Silver,
this is the most salient measure of a state’s electoral
importance in a given cycle, and it is measured not by the
closeness of the vote in the state, but by the closeness of the
popular vote differential in that state to the popular vote
differential in the national mean.123 Table 2 identifies the
tipping point states from the 2012 election.
The three remaining metrics each attempt to measure
whether a state might be viewed as “within reach” by a
contemporary presidential campaign. “W/in 12” identifies
those states whose popular vote margin was within twelve
places of the national mean popular vote margin in the 2012
election. (The number twelve was chosen because it
approximates a quartile of the fifty states).124 “Flip” signifies
that the state has “flipped,” that is, has produced an
electoral majority for each party at least once within the
past four election cycles; a presidential campaign is likely to
believe that such a state could be flipped back in the next
election. “<10” means that the popular vote differential in
that state was less than ten percent at least one time in the
past four election cycles. A political campaign might view
such a state as winnable. For example, in 2012 the Obama
campaign initially viewed Arizona as winnable—based
apparently on this measure coupled with increasing
participation of Hispanic voters—despite that fact that the
Democrats carried the state only once since 1948 (in 1996,
121. See, e.g., Nate Silver, Arizona is (Probably) Not a Swing State,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Apr. 27, 2012, 7:56 AM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.
com/2012/04/27/arizona-is-probably-not-a-swing-state/?_php=true&_type=blogs&
_r=0.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Nate Silver, As Nation and Party Change, Republicans are at an Electoral
Disadvantage, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 8, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.
blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/as-nation-and-parties-change-republicans-are-atan-electoral-college-disadvantage (discrepancies between Silver and Leip’s
popular vote margins reflect refined data available after the Silver article’s
publication).
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when a major third party candidate drew a decisive number
of votes away from the Republican).125
Thirteen of these marijuana legalization states meet at
least one of these measures of a swing state and nine states
meet at least two measures. In contrast, only twelve nonmarijuana states meet one or more of these criteria for
“swing states.”126 Perhaps of even greater contemporary
electoral significance is a short list of three marijuana
states: Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada. These three
states, accounting for a total rising from seventeen to
twenty electoral votes, each meet four swing state criteria.
All three flipped between 2000 and 2012.127 In 2000, Nevada
could have tipped the election to Al Gore even without
Florida; George W. Bush won Nevada that year by 3.55
percent. In 2004, Bush won all three by margins of less than
5 percent; the three together could have swung the election
to John Kerry. In a close electoral contest, a presidential
campaign flouts these states’ policy preferences at its peril.

125. See Adam Nagourney, Obama Camp, Seeing Shift, Bets on Long Shot in
Arizona, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/16/
us/politics/obama-campaign-turns-attention-on-arizona.html?pagewanted=all.
126. These are: Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.
127. Seven non-marijuana states flipped in the same time frame: Florida,
Indiana, Iowa, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, and Virginia.
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Electoral Votes

Year
MJ
Legal

'00

'04, '08

'12

Alaska

1998

3

3

3

x

Arizona

2010

8

10

11

x

California

1996

54

55

55

Colorado

2000

8

9

9

State

Connecticut

2012

8

7

7

Delaware

2011

3

3

3

Dist. Columbia

2010

2*

3

3

Hawaii

1998

4

4

4

Maine

1999

4

4

4

Maryland

2003

10

10

10

Massachusetts

2012

12

12

11

Michigan

2008

18

17

16

Montana

2004

3

3

3

Nevada

2000

4

5

6

New Jersey

2010

15

15

14

New Mexico

2007

5

5

Oregon

1998

7

Rhode Island

2006

Vermont

2004

NSTP

x

W/in
12

x

Flip

<10
x

x

x
x
x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

x

5

x

x

x

7

7

x

x

x

4

4

4

3

3

3

Washington
1998
11
11
* One electoral vote withheld in abstention.

12

x

x

x
x

Table 2: Marijuana Legalization States Meeting One or More
Swing State Criteria

While California is not one of the thirteen swing states
and has voted Democratic in every election since 1988, it is
too big an electoral prize for the Republicans simply to write
it off. It had been solidly Republican from 1952 to 1988 and
was almost competitive in 2000 and 2004. Moreover, if the
GOP changes strategy to aggressively court Hispanic voters,
it could become competitive again.
Conceivably, Colorado alone could drive a presidential
campaign to tread softly on the marijuana legalization
issue. Colorado, as an early adopter of medical marijuana
legalization (2000) and as one of the first two states to
legalize recreational marijuana (2012), is arguably the most
salient marijuana state and certainly the most salient
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marijuana state in electoral math. Colorado flipped from the
Republican to Democratic column in 2008 and 2012, and it
meets all four swing state criteria. Although President
Obama won the state by just over five percent in 2012, the
pre-election polling showed the state to be extremely close
through most of the race. Moreover, Colorado was the
tipping point state in both the 2008 and 2012 elections,
providing the 270th electoral vote to Obama each time.128
This means that, in each of the past two election cycles, the
most likely Republican path to victory had to travel through
Colorado.
Based on the foregoing, it seems likely that presidential
campaigns would think long and hard before taking an
unequivocal stance in favor of a blanket nationwide
marijuana prohibition. A policy of leaving the question of
marijuana to the states could easily be perceived by
presidential aspirants as a safer course that avoids the risk
of alienating critical numbers of voters in key swing states.
The next Section suggests that something like this has
indeed been occurring.
B. Drug Policy and Presidential Campaigns
How have recent presidential campaigns treated the
marijuana issue? In 2012, both major party campaigns came
out seemingly opposed to recreational marijuana
legalization, and their positions on medical marijuana were
equivocal, with opposition to medical marijuana appearing
marginally stronger from the Republican side. But the
vagaries of political messaging and presidential politics
might require looking beyond the express policy statements

128. In both 2008 and 2012, the states with larger Democratic margins of
victory than Colorado totaled only 263 electoral votes. In 2012, for instance, had
the national popular vote been tied and the state margins all trended in the
same direction, Romney would have won Virginia, Ohio, and Florida for 266
electoral votes, and Obama could not have won without Colorado’s nine electoral
votes. See Nate Silver, As Nation and Parties Change, Republicans Are at an
Electoral College Disadvantage, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 8, 2012, 4:15 PM),
http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/as-nation-and-partieschange-republicans-are-at-an-electoral-college-disadvantage.
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of the campaigns and the actions of the Obama Justice
Department to consider their nuances.
A thorough understanding of the Republican Party’s
rather tepid and equivocal statements disapproving medical
marijuana requires placing it in historical context. Against
the backdrop of Republican presidential campaign rhetoric
on crime and drugs, the 2008 and 2012 campaigns of John
McCain and Mitt Romney adopted a strikingly low-key
approach.
For nine presidential election cycles in the thirty-two
years from 1968 to 2000, crime, drugs, race, and the
linkages between the three have been a staple of Republican
Party strategy. Based on this history, one might expect a
Republican presidential campaign to exploit what would in
prior elections have been a golden opportunity to recreate
the linkage between crime, drugs, and race: a black
President who, with his black Attorney General, declined to
vigorously enforce the Controlled Substances Act against
medical marijuana states. The fact that the Romney
campaign declined to do this—and that the McCain
campaign similarly declined to try this strategy when
candidate Obama had made statements promising a lowkey approach toward medical marijuana—cries out for
explanation. A complete explanation undoubtedly includes
several factors beyond the scope of this Article—a growing
perception that a racial appeal to white voters will no longer
suffice to produce an electoral college majority, perhaps.
The question for this Article is whether, in addition to other
causal factors, “electoral math” has weighed in favor of
supporting state autonomy on this issue.
It is now a well-established historical understanding
that the Nixon campaign of 1968 set out to undermine the
Democratic “New Deal coalition” that had largely held
together for the nine previous election cycles.129 He did so by
pursuing his so-called “southern strategy,” to peel away the
129. In every election from 1932 to 1964, the Democratic presidential
candidate won at least six of the eleven states of the former Confederacy. (From
1932-1944, Franklin Roosevelt won all eleven of those states each time). See,
e.g., 1 CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY’S GUIDE TO U.S. ELECTIONS 754-63 (John L.
Moore, Jon P. Preimesberger, & David R. Tarr eds., 4th ed. 2001).
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eleven states of the “old South” (the former Confederacy)
from the Democratic electoral column.130 He was largely
successful.131 Because the Republicans’ historical traditions
and need to appeal broadly throughout the north precluded
them from attacking the Democrats overtly for their support
of the civil rights legislation of the Johnson Administration,
they instead sought to appeal to racist and race-conscious
white voters through a subterranean linkage of race and
crime.132 It is telling that, whereas the Republican Party
platform during Nixon’s unsuccessful 1960 campaign did
not even mention the word “crime,” the 1968 platform, and
Nixon’s campaign messages, made crime control a
centerpiece.133
After 1968, crime featured as a major element in every
Republican presidential campaign for the next thirty-two
years. The linkage with race has sometimes been quite
overt: the infamous “Willie Horton” ad run by the George
H.W. Bush campaign against Michael Dukakis in 1988 told
of a murder committed by a black parolee released during
Dukakis’ governorship illustrated by lurid images of the
dark-skinned Horton.134
Illegal drugs have been a major element of the
Republican Party’s “war on crime” since 1968. As part of its
crime control agenda in the 1968 presidential race, the
Republican Party platform promised “a vigorous nation130. See, e.g., DAN T. CARTER, FROM GEORGE WALLACE TO NEWT GINGRICH: RACE
1963-1994, at 27-29 (1996).

IN THE CONSERVATIVE COUNTERREVOLUTION,

131. Democratic Candidate Hubert Humphrey won only one of those states,
Texas. The remaining ten states divided evenly between Nixon and third party
anti-civil rights candidate George Wallace.
132. See, e.g., EARL BLACK & MERLE BLACK, THE RISE OF SOUTHERN
REPUBLICANS (2002); CARTER, supra note 130; James Boyd, Nixon’s Southern
Strategy ‘It’s All in the Charts,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1970, at 25, 105-11.
133. Compare Republican Platform 1960, in 2 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS
604-21 (Donald B. Johnson ed., 1978), with Republican Platform 1968, in 2
NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra, at 748-63.
134. See JACK W. GERMOND & JULES WITCOVER, WHOSE BROAD STRIPES AND
BRIGHT STARS?: THE TRIVIAL PURSUIT OF PRESIDENCY, 1988, at 10-12, 357-58, 41011, 422-23 (1989); Morgan Whittaker, The Legacy of the Willie Horton Ad Lives
On, 25 Years Later, MSNBC.COM (Oct. 28, 2013, 10:14 AM),
http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/the-legacy-the-willie-horton-ad-lives.
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wide drive against trafficking in narcotics and dangerous
drugs, including special emphasis on the first steps toward
addiction[:] the use of marijuana and such drugs as LSD.”135
In nine of the ten presidential election years from 1968 to
2004, the Republican platform devoted language of
significant quantity and vehemence to combatting illegal
drugs, attacking Democrats as permissive on drug policies
in particular and soft on crime more generally. The 1972
Republican Platform focused great attention on “the twin
evils of crime and drug abuse,” and decried “[t]he
permissiveness of the 1960’s [which] left no legacy more
insidious than drug abuse. . . . We pledge the most intensive
law enforcement war ever waged. We are determined to
drive the pushers of dangerous drugs from the streets,
schools and neighborhoods of America.”136 After an
uncharacteristically mild year on the topic during Gerald
Ford’s campaign in 1976,137 the Republican platform in
Reagan’s two presidential campaigns renewed the “war on
drugs:”
In recent years, a murderous epidemic of drug abuse has swept
our country. Mr. Carter, through his policies and his personnel,
has demonstrated little interest in stopping its ravages.
Republicans consider drug abuse an intolerable threat to our
society, especially to the young. We pledge a government that will
138
take seriously its responsibility to curb illegal drug traffic.

In 1984, the Republican platform “reaffirm[ed] that the
eradication of illegal drug traffic is a top national

135. Republican Platform 1968, in 2 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note
133, at 748-63.
136. Republican Platform 1972, in 2 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note
133, at 851-86.
137. The single reference to drugs in that year’s platform advocated
mandatory minimum sentences for “exceptionally serious crimes, such as
trafficking in hard drugs, kidnapping and aircraft hijacking[.]”Republican
Platform 1976, in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORM, supra note 133, at 965-94.
138. Republican Party Platform of 1980, July 15, 1980, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25844 (last visited Feb. 28,
2014).
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priority.”139 The platform during George H.W. Bush’s
campaign in 1988 touted the Reagan Administration’s
policies for having “fought to reverse crime rates and
launched the nation’s first all-out war on drug abuse,”
devoting two lengthy sections to the drug issue (“Drug-Free
America” and “Combatting Narcotics: Defending Our
Children”).140 The 1992 platform argued that “[n]arcotics
drives street crime” and reaffirmed that “[t]he Republican
Party is committed to a drug-free America. During the last
twelve years, we have radically reversed the Democrats’
attitude of tolerance toward narcotics[.]”141 Drug and crime
planks continued to appear in the 1996, 2000, and 2004
platforms in which, each time, the GOP assailed what it
deemed to be the under-enforcement of anti-drug laws
during the Clinton Administration.142

139. Republican Party Platform of 1984, August 20, 1984, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25845 (last visited
Feb. 28, 2014).
140. Republican Party Platform of 1988, August 16, 1988, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25846 (last visited
Feb. 28, 2014).
141. Republican Party Platform of 1992, August 17, 1992, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25847 (last visited Feb. 28,
2014).
142. The 1996 platform is instructive. In a section labeled “Getting Tough on
Crime,” the GOP platform charged that:
During Bill Clinton’s tenure, America has become a more fearful place,
especially for the elderly and for women and children. Violent crime has
turned our homes into prisons, our streets and schoolyards into
battlegrounds. It devours half a trillion dollars every year.
Unfortunately, far worse could be coming in the near future. . . .
This is, in part the legacy of liberalism—in the old Democrat Congress,
in the Clinton Department of Justice, and in the courts, where judges
appointed by Democrat presidents continue their assault against the
rights of law-abiding Americans. For too long government policy has
been controlled by criminals and their defense lawyers. Democrat
Congresses cared more about rights of criminals than safety for
Americans. . . .
Only Republican resolve can prepare our nation to deal with the four
deadly threats facing us in the early years of the 21st Century: violent
crime, drugs, terrorism, and international organized crime.
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Marijuana criminalization was an important element of
the Republican wars on crime and drugs. As noted above,
marijuana was classified as a schedule I controlled
substance under the 1970 Controlled Substances Act, signed
into law by President Nixon, making its possession and
distribution for any purpose a federal crime. The linkage of
marijuana, crime, and race dated back to at least the 1930s.
At that time, a nationwide campaign to criminalize
marijuana, which led to the passage of the Marijuana Tax
Act at the federal level and various state law prohibitions,
stressed the connection between marijuana and the
purportedly “dissolute” lifestyles and jazz music of the
African American community.143 The Republican platforms
expressly or impliedly mentioned marijuana in most years
from 1968 to 2000. The opening salvo in the Republican
“war on drugs” in 1968 promised “a vigorous nation-wide
drive against trafficking in narcotics and dangerous drugs,
including special emphasis on the first steps toward
addiction: the use of marijuana and such drugs as LSD.”144
Republican Party Platform of 1996, August 12, 1996, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25848 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
Likewise, in 2000 and 2004, the G.W. Bush campaign assailed “the glamorizing
of drugs” and the Clinton Administration policies:
The other part of the team—a president engaged in the fight against
crime—has been ineffective for the last eight years. To the contrary,
sixteen hard-core terrorists were granted clemency, sending the wrong
signal to others who would use terror against the American people. The
administration started out by slashing the nation’s funding for drug
interdiction and overseas operations against the narcotics cartel. It
finishes by presiding over the near collapse of drug policy.
Republican Party Platform of 2000, July 31, 2000, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25849 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
“After witnessing eight years of Presidential inaction on the war against drugs
during the prior Administration, we applaud President Bush for his steady
commitment to reducing drug use among teens. The Administration recently
exceeded its two-year goal of reducing drug use among young people.”
Republican Party Platform of 2004, August 30, 2004, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidence.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25850 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
143. ERIC SCHLOSSER, REEFER MADNESS: SEX, DRUGS, AND CHEAP LABOR IN THE
AMERICAN BLACK MARKET 20-21 (2003).
144. Republican Platform 1968, in 2 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note
133, at 748, 751.
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In 1972, the last time marijuana decriminalization and
legalization were on the national policy agenda, the
Republican platform asserted: “We firmly oppose efforts to
make drugs easily available. We equally oppose the
legalization of marijuana. We intend to solve problems, not
create bigger ones by legalizing drugs of unknown physical
impact.”145 The 1984 Republican platform espousing Ronald
Reagan’s re-election bid touted the Reagan Administration’s
“aggressive Marijuana Eradication and Suppression
Program” (1984).146 The platform during President Bush’s
1992 re-election campaign plainly had marijuana in mind
when it stated: “We oppose legalizing or decriminalizing
drugs. That is a morally abhorrent idea, the last vestige of
an ill-conceived philosophy that counseled the legitimacy of
permissiveness.”147 The platform during Bob Dole’s 1996
campaign, seeking perhaps to make hay of Bill Clinton’s
admission to having once tried marijuana, said:
The verdict is in on Bill Clinton’s moral leadership: after 11 years
of steady decline, the use of marijuana among teens doubled in the
two years after 1992. At the same time, the use of cocaine and
148
methamphetamines dramatically increased.
That shocks but should not surprise. For in the war on drugs—an
essential component of the fight against crime—today’s
Democratic Party has been a conscientious objector. Nowhere is
the discrepancy between Bill Clinton’s rhetoric and his actions
more apparent. Mr. Clinton’s personal record has been a betrayal
of the nation’s trust, sending the worst possible signal to the
149
nation’s youth.

145. Republican Platform 1972, in 2 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, supra note
133, at 851, 870.
146. Republican Party Platform of 1984, August 20, 1984, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25845 (last visited
Feb. 28, 2014).
147. Republican Party Platform of 1992, August 17, 1992, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25847 (last visited Feb. 28,
2014).
148. Republican Party Platform of 1996, August 12, 1996, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25848 (last visited Feb. 28,
2014).
149. Id.
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Significantly, this platform was written for the election
in which the first referendum initiative to legalize medical
marijuana was on the ballot in California due for a vote on
the same day as the general election.150 Clinton won the
state by a 13% margin, though he received a smaller
percentage of the total vote than that in favor of the medical
marijuana initiative (51% compared to nearly 56%).151
The Republican platforms began to show a marked
change around 2000. That year, the attack on the Clinton
drug policies was couched in terms of protection of children
and schools rather than as a war on crime.152 Undoubtedly,
falling crime rates were perceived as making crime a less
fruitful campaign issue than in past years. In 2004, the
“war on drugs” was mentioned only in the context of its
purported impact on reducing illegal drug use among
teens.153 In 2008 and 2012, the Republican platforms no
longer linked the “war on drugs” to a domestic crime
150. See Bill Jones, California Secretary of State, Statement of Vote, Nov. 5,
1996, at i, 3, 42, http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/1996-general/sovcomplete.pdf.
151. Id.
152. The platform stated:
The entire nation has suffered from the administration’s virtual
surrender in the war against drugs, but children in poor communities
have paid the highest price in the threat of addiction and the daily
reality of violence. Drug kingpins have turned entire neighborhoods
into wastelands and ruined uncounted lives with their poison. The
statistics are shocking. Since 1992, among 10th graders, overall drug
use has increased 55 percent, marijuana and hashish use has risen 91
percent, heroin use has gone up 92 percent, and cocaine use has soared
133 percent. Not surprisingly, teen attitudes toward drug abuse have
veered sharply away from disapproval. With abundant supplies in their
deadly arsenal, drug traffickers are targeting younger children, as well
as rural kids.
Still, there is no substitute for presidential leadership, whether
internationally or here at home, where America’s families cry out for
safe, drug-free schools.
Republican Party Platform of 2000, July 31, 2000, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25849 (last visited Feb. 28, 2013).
153. Republican Party Platform of 2004, August 30, 2004, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25850 (last visited Feb. 28,
2014).
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problem, but rather linked it to international terrorism and
illegal immigration. As the 2008 platform put matters, “In
an era of porous borders, the war on drugs and the war on
terror have become a single enterprise.”154
The Republican Party’s downplaying of marijuana,
particularly in the 2008 and 2012 election campaigns, is
striking. In the last three presidential campaign cycles, the
Republican platforms have not even mentioned the word
“marijuana” or proxy code words like “legalization” or
“decriminalization,” despite having done so in seven of the
nine party platforms from 1968 to 2000.155 What is more,
attacking Democrats as soft on crime and drugs was
consistent Republican campaign fodder from 1968 to 2000.
Indeed, in 1996 and 2000, Republican platforms explicitly
linked purportedly permissive drug policies with increased
marijuana use.156
On the whole, in light of this history, it would have been
natural for Republican presidential candidates in 2008 and
especially 2012 to attack candidate and President Obama as
“soft on drugs, soft on crime.” The fact that Obama and his
Attorney General Eric Holder are both African American
would seem to lend itself to exploitation of the age-old—if
heinous—Republican strategy of linking drugs, crime, and
race. That this was not done is a phenomenon suggesting a
major policy shift that warrants explanation.
What did the Republican candidates say during the
2012 presidential race? In twenty Republican Party primary
154. 2008 Republican Party Platform, September 1, 2008, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=78545 (last visited Feb. 28,
2014).
155. The word “marijuana” has appeared in only one Democratic platform, in
1984, during Walter Mondale’s campaign to unseat Ronald Reagan, whose “war
on drugs” was enjoying the height of its popularity. See Democratic Party
Platform of 1984, July 16, 1984, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29608 (last visited Feb. 28, 2014).
156. See Republican Party Platform of 1996, August 12, 1996, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25848 (last visited Feb. 28,
2014); Republican Party Platform of 2000, July 31, 2000, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25849 (last visited Feb. 28,
2014).
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debates, marijuana was referenced exactly once, when darkhorse libertarian candidate Ron Paul came out in favor of
medical marijuana; none of his opponents touched the
issue.157 Otherwise, the Republican candidates stayed on
what appears to have been the GOP message, making their
very few references to illegal drugs in the context of
immigration and national security.158
In the general election campaign, marijuana was not
discussed in any of the four presidential or vice presidential
debates. Undoubtedly, the question would have been raised
had either party been making a major campaign issue of
it.159 Mitt Romney, far from attacking the Obama
Administration for going easy on medical marijuana, made
clear that he would rather not discuss the issue of
marijuana legalization at all. When asked by a reporter to
comment on Colorado’s marijuana legalization initiative
during a campaign stop in that state, Romney “was visibly
taken aback” and evaded the question by saying, “Aren’t
there issues of significance that you’d like to talk about?”160
Romney’s position was reluctantly stated, somewhat
equivocally, and often through proxies and campaign
spokespersons rather than by himself directly. For example,
when Romney’s running mate Paul Ryan stated, in response
to a reporter’s question, that medical marijuana legalization
157. Republican Candidates Debate in Washington, DC, November 22, 2011,
AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97332 (last
visited Mar. 24, 2014).
158. See generally Presidential Debates 1960-2012, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/debates.php (last visited Mar. 24, 2014). The
one exception was Ron Paul, who spoke of the disproportionate rate of
incarceration of African Americans for drug crimes. Republican Candidates
Debate in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, January 16, 2012, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=98929 (last visited Mar. 24,
2014).
159. The last time “marijuana” was mentioned in a presidential or vice
presidential debate was by Bob Dole, who spoke of rising marijuana use in 1996.
See Presidential Debate in San Diego, October 16, 1996, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.ws/ndex.php?pid=52115 (last visited Mar.
24, 2014).
160. Kristen Wyett, Colorado Pot Vote Could Affect Obama-Romney Race,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (June 5, 2012, 3:33 AM), bigstory.ap.org/article/colo-vote-potcould-affect-obama-romney-race.
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should be left to the states rather than the federal
government, it was a campaign spokesperson—and not
Romney—who “corrected” the record by asserting that the
Romney
campaign
opposed
medical
marijuana
legalization.161 It was highly likely that Ryan’s statement
was not a gaffe but was designed to send a calculatedly
mixed signal.
The Obama Administration’s position on enforcing the
CSA in medical marijuana states has been equivocal, and
the increased prosecutorial activity in the run-up to the
election could perhaps be entered in the ledger as evidence
against the “Colorado” thesis argued in this Article. But the
reality may be more complicated. It is certainly plausible to
interpret the Obama record as taking steps toward
placating the pro-marijuana vote in swing states, while at
the same time guarding his flank against the kind of “soft
on drugs, soft on crime” attacks made by Republicans in the
past. And the Cole memo’s distinct softening of the
Administration’s previous hard line stance toward state
recreational legalization may well reflect solicitude toward
Colorado and other swing states in anticipation of Obama’s
Democratic successors’ 2016 presidential race.
IV. POLITICAL SAFEGUARDS AND PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
The previous two Sections provide a striking illustration
of how a President, responsive to electoral politics, will have
both the incentive and the ability to be responsive to state
policy choices—at least if those policy choices are salient
and localized in at least some electorally important states.
It remains to be considered how presidential politics, as a
political safeguard of federalism, relates to the traditional
framework
in
which
political
safeguards
are
congressionally-focused and the only alternative is judicial
safeguards in the form of non-deferential judicial review.

161. Daniel Politi, Paul Ryan: States Have the Right to Legalize Medical
Marijuana, SLATE.COM (Sept. 8, 2012, 1:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
the_slatest/2012/09/08/paul_ryan_says_medical_marijuana_legalization_is_up_
to_states.html.
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To date, the political safeguards of federalism debate
has under-emphasized the question of the relative
sensitivity of the three branches of government to state
autonomy interests. Here, I do not purport to complete this
task but simply to begin it: continuing to focus on state
marijuana legalization as an example, I will offer some
thoughts about the kinds of questions that need to be
answered if the political safeguards of federalism debate is
to go forward in any constructive way.
Any account of safeguards of federalism will be
incomplete and distorted unless it takes adequate account of
the post-New Deal regulatory environment.162 In this
environment, federal regulatory jurisdiction is nearly
coextensive with that of the states, and federal regulations
occupy broad swaths of our regulated lives. In this
environment, the idea that constitutional barriers will
protect state autonomy by blocking federal attempts to
enter legislative fields is at best an incomplete picture and
at worst, quaint.
A more complete and up-to-date set of questions asks
what the three branches of government can do to roll back,
or limit the preemptive effect of, existing federal legislation.
Courts can strike down federal laws or else interpret them
in ways that leave policy-making latitude for states.
Congress can repeal laws or amend them. The President can
enforce them. In this Section, I argue that the President
may well be in the best position of the three branches to
protect federalism, at least in some circumstances. As will
be seen, in the instance of marijuana legalization, the
President may well have the greatest sensitivity of the three
branches to state political aspirations and may have the
most flexibility in crafting responsive measures. We will
look at each of the three branches in turn.
A. The Courts
In this Article, I do not purport to argue that judicial
review has no, or little, role in safeguarding federalism. But
proponents of judicial safeguards of federalism would do
162. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Gerkin, supra note 74, at 1282-83.
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well to consider how well-positioned courts in fact are to do
so.
The Supreme Court has played no role whatsoever in
safeguarding federalism on the marijuana legalization
issue. It has decided two cases which might have limited the
impact of the CSA on state marijuana legalization and
rejected the invitation to do so both times. In 2001, in
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, the
Court upheld an injunction shutting down a California
medical marijuana dispensary operating in accordance with
California’s “compassionate use” law.163 The Court rejected
the argument that the state policy could be accommodated
by reading a “medical necessity” defense into the federal
CSA.164 In 2005 in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court by a 6-3
majority rejected a plausible argument that the Commerce
Clause could not sustain the application of the CSA to
prohibit purely intrastate possession and distribution of
medical marijuana that was legal under state law.165 The
deciding votes were supplied by Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, who split from their conservative pro-state
autonomy colleagues (Rehnquist, O’Connor, and Thomas).
Apparently their aversion to marijuana legalization
overcame their scruples against an expansive interpretation
of the Commerce Clause that had caused them to strike
down two prior federal statutes and that reasserted itself in
their votes to strike down Obamacare in 2012.166 As far as
the Supreme Court seems to be concerned, Congress has
plenary power over drug policy in the United States.
Perhaps it is unsurprising that the Court has done
nothing for state policy autonomy in this area. The blunt
instrument of striking down laws as exceeding the
legislative power of Congress is available in very few cases
in the absence of a drastic revision of judicial philosophy
163. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 486-89,
498-99 (2001).
164. Id. at 490.
165. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2005).
166. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2642-47 (2012)
(Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., and Alito, J., dissenting).
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regarding the Commerce Clause and other powers of
Congress. This post-New Deal judicial philosophy is made
up in part of a constitutional notion of deference to
legislative choices, and in part on the related ideas that
economics infuses most social problems, and that most
social
problems
are
plausibly—and
perhaps
presumptively—viewed as national. In this regulatory
environment, localism results from a devolutionary policymaking approach consciously chosen at the center rather
than a fixed decision embedded in the constitution. These
ideas are virtually indisputable, and since disputing them is
more of a political choice than a legal theory, constitutional
law has little to say on the matter.
In theory, the Court could develop a more refined set of
doctrinal tools by using statutory interpretation to
safeguard federalism. In Raich, the Court could easily have
held that the CSA did not intend to pre-empt state law
experiments with marijuana legalization. Existing “clear
statement” rules would have provided one obvious avenue.167
While it might have stretched a point to apply these
presumptions to the CSA, it would not have stretched
credulity close to the breaking point. The advantage of these
approaches is precisely that they do not invoke judicial
review. As statutory interpretation techniques, they are
subject to Congressional override. They are thus more
deferential and better suited to more frequent use than the
more radical step of striking down laws.168
The fact is that the Court has been loath to adhere to a
strict and consistent application of federalism-protective,
clear statement rules, especially when it comes to applying
the presumption against preemption,169 and it is worth
thinking about why. Perhaps a good-faith effort to balance
federal and state power makes the Court reluctant to use
the clear statement rules in a systematic way to promote
167. See Schwartz, supra note 98, at 626-28.
168. See id. at 633-34; Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two
Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 35, 101, 126 (2004).
169. See Schwartz, supra note 98, at 606; Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet
of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts Court, 2011
SUP. CT. REV. 253, 258, 307-10 (2011).
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state policymaking autonomy on the ground that, as a
practical matter, they are not much more deferential to
Congress than judicial review. But it is also worth noting
that a strong—that is, uniform or blanket—application of
these doctrines would be more protective of state autonomy,
but at a cost: not only to the application of federal power but
to judicial policy discretion. The more federalism-protective
doctrines of statutory interpretation are applied on a “caseby-case” basis, the more discretion the Justices have to
indulge a substantive policy preference for the particular
state or federal law at issue.
Both in terms of structure and inclination, the courts
may not be the best-positioned of the three branches to
protect federalism. To the extent that the judicial
safeguards of federalism require imposing constitutional
limits on Congressional power, the Court’s opportunity to do
so rarely arises. And the Court is disinclined to make more
than occasional use of clear statement rules to protect
federalism, possibly because the Justices’ own ability to
influence substantive policy would be weakened by tying
their hands in that way.
B. Congress
In theory, Congress is thought to be the most politically
sensitive of the three branches to state autonomy.
Proponents of the political safeguards theory have pointed
to state representation in Congress, the connection of
national legislators to state party organizations, and the
presence of state and local governmental lobbying
organizations, among other factors.170 Proponents have also
pointed to the enduring tradition of localism rooted in
popular sentiment: the widespread belief that many
problems are best handled at subnational levels of
government.171 And national politicians have long
recognized the advantages of ducking politically volatile

170. See supra Parts I.B-I.C.
171. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 1, at 220; Wechsler, supra note 1, at 546.
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questions by contending that they are issues “for the
states.”172
Without denigrating any of these factors, it is worth
pointing to certain countervailing ones illustrated by the
marijuana legalization problem. Congress has two potential
ways to safeguard federalism where an existing law
preempts state policy choices: it can repeal the law or
amend it. Marijuana legalization does not depend on repeal
of the CSA, and various possible amendments could give
room to states to experiment with legalization laws. Most
obviously, Congress could create some sort of exemption
from the CSA for persons in compliance with state
marijuana laws. A narrower approach—one that would not
acknowledge state permission for recreational use—would
be to move marijuana from the CSA’s schedule I (illegal for
all purposes) to a lesser schedule, thereby permitting
medical use of marijuana along the other lines of other
controlled medications.
No matter what, Congress must legislate in order to
respond to state marijuana legalization initiatives. The
“veto gates” and barriers to federal lawmaking observed by
Bradford Clark—constitutional and otherwise—may well
protect federalism where no federal regulation is already in
place.173 But they have just the opposite effect where there is
a federal law, such as the CSA. On top of the veto gates in
general, the CSA is subject to the phenomenon that
criminal statutes are notorious legislative ratchets—much
easier to enact than to repeal.174 Any politician seeking to
roll back a criminal law risks being labeled “soft on crime”
at the next election.
Virtually all participants in the political safeguards
debate—whether proponents like Wechsler or Kramer,
172. See José D. Villalobos, Issue Evasion, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF U.S.
CAMPAIGNS, ELECTIONS AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 334, 334-35 (Kenneth F.
Warren ed., 2008).
173. Bradford R. Clark, The Procedural Safeguards of Federalism, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1681, 1681 (2008).
174. Schwartz, supra note 98, at 573 & n.14; see, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 545-47 (2001).
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critics like Yoo or Calabresi, revisionists like Clark, or the
justices themselves—have assumed that federalism
safeguards, whatever they may be, must necessarily and
only operate as a check against federal legislation that
encroaches on state prerogatives. As Wechsler put it, the
political safeguards are “intrinsically well adapted to
retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the
domain of the states.”175 They uniformly overlook situations
such as that presented by the CSA, where Congress has
already acted to preempt the states, so that further federal
legislation is needed to make room for states to effectuate
their own policies. In such instances, the Constitution’s
congressional structures do comparatively little to undo old
intrusions.
Considering how often federalism debaters quote
Brandeis’s “states as laboratories of experimentation in
social policy,”176 the oversight is surprising. Brandeis
envisions a policy experiment undertaken by “a single
courageous state.”177 But no matter how responsive that
state’s congressional delegation is to state policy
preferences, that single state’s delegation will be very far
from commanding a legislative majority. Where a federal
statute commands widespread national support, it is hard
to imagine Congress responding favorably to the wishes of a
single, a few, or even a sizable plurality of “courageous
states” seeking to experiment. As has been well
documented, Congress has already ignored numerous
appeals from experimenting states to modify the CSA’s flatout ban on marijuana. Congress may not choose to respond
favorably to state marijuana legalization initiatives until a
broad national consensus supports such a response,
particularly given the need for individual members of
Congress for cover from a “soft on crime” label. At that
point, a policy shift by Congress would constitute an
exceedingly watered-down instance of a political safeguard
of federalism.
175. Wechsler, supra note 1, at 558 (emphasis added).
176. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
177. Id.
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C. The President
I do not contend that the President necessarily and
always is the best positioned of the three branches to
protect federalism as a structural matter or in practice. In
the case of marijuana legalization, however, events have
clearly shown the President to be the most politically
sensitive to the policy initiatives of a minority of states and
the best-positioned to craft a flexible response.
As we have seen, the policy preference of a relatively
small number of electoral swing states has commanded the
attention of both political parties. It appears to have
motivated the incumbent administration to markedly alter
its enforcement practices in deference to state legalization
experiments. And it appears to have caused the Republican
Party to back away from its traditional “tough on crime”
posture, as its platforms and candidates have opted to avoid
the marijuana legalization question as much as possible—
thereby giving the Obama Administration more latitude to
play to the interests and preferences of the marijuana
legalization states.
It might be argued in response that twenty marijuana
legalization states add up to a broad national trend rather
than a scattered state-level policy preference. But two
points weigh against such a counterargument. First, it
seems unlikely that the Republicans would have abandoned
their historical “red meat” issue had marijuana legalization
been localized in safe-Democratic states. At the same time,
the Democrats might well have determined they could count
on winning states like Maryland, Massachusetts, and
Vermont even if the Obama Administration had taken a
tougher enforcement line on marijuana legalization. In
other words, what decisively influenced the presidential
campaigns on the marijuana issue was most likely the
policy preference of a relatively small subset of thirteen or
fewer swing states. It is entirely plausible that presidential
politics would have taken the same approach to marijuana
legalization if that had been limited to a single state—
Colorado. It is thus fair to say that the presidential politics
has shown a high degree of sensitivity to autonomous state
policy choices in this area.
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Looking at how a sitting President can respond to such
political signals, what we see is significant flexibility
filtered through a seemingly limited category of
prosecutorial discretion. It is no secret that the on-theground enforcement of the law has a tremendous impact on
a law’s ability to influence behavior. Robert Mikos has
argued that executive branch under-enforcement of a
federal regulation can be protective of federalism where, as
here, full enforcement of the criminal prohibition requires a
significant commitment of resources in the form of law
enforcement agents and prosecutors.178 While Mikos’s point
is no doubt correct as far as it goes, it does not fully capture
the reality of the Obama Administration’s approach to
marijuana legalization. Nor does his argument fully
appreciate the significant difference between underenforcement as an epiphenomenon of resource constraints
(Mikos’s description) and under-enforcement stemming
from a conscious, announced policy choice. For one thing, a
conscious, announced policy by the Executive Branch allows
the President to reap a political benefit from voters that
mere under-enforcement does not. For another thing, the
deterrent effect of the law will differ in the two situations:
more people are likely to be deterred by the law on the
books than will be deterred when told expressly that the
law will not be enforced.
In theory, the interpretive and enforcement discretion of
the Executive Branch gives it a range of options for
accommodating state policies that contradict the letter of
federal law, constrained by the President’s duty to “take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.” The Obama
Administration has not chosen to follow the statutorily
authorized path of removing marijuana from schedule I.179
The Justice Department has stopped short, though not far
178. Robert A. Mikos, Medical Marijuana and the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 997, 1004-09 (2012).
179. The failure of the administration to pursue this avenue illustrates a
significant limits placed on Congressional options. Congress can try to
safeguard federalism by statutory provisions giving the executive branch
discretion to grant a waiver, but this may simply fob off the safeguard of
federalism to the Executive Branch.
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short, of announcing a formal waiver of the CSA to
accommodate state legalization laws. By couching the policy
determination in terms of prosecutorial discretion, the
Obama Administration avoids judicial review of the action180
while minimizing the political risk inherent in a more
formal shift in the governing law or in a charge that the
President is not enforcing the law in good faith. The
prosecutorial discretion/enforcement priorities approach is
thus more flexible than the formal legal avenues available
to the other branches, because it can achieve far-reaching
practical effects while minimizing political backlash.
CONCLUSION
The decades-old debate over whether federalism is best
protected by judicial or political processes—and hence, over
whether the Supreme Court should apply a deferential
approach to questions regarding the scope of national
legislative jurisdiction—has become prominent again.
Although it upheld “Obamacare” as an exercise of the taxing
power, a majority of the Court held that a key element of
the national health law fell outside Congress’ commerce
power, raising significant questions for future economic
legislation. This debate over the “political safeguards of
federalism” has, up to now, virtually ignored the impact of
presidential electoral politics as an important element
strengthening the argument that political processes protect
the policymaking autonomy of the states.
The example of state marijuana legalization offers
strong evidence supporting the notion that presidential
politics can safeguard federalism under certain conditions.
The medical marijuana example illustrates what those
conditions are. Where a salient state policy choice is in
180. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-70 (1996)
(prosecutorial discretion not judicially reviewable absent a well-supported claim
of race discrimination). Moreover, it is doubtful whether anyone would have
standing to raise a claim of the President’s failure to enforce the CSA. See, e.g.,
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-78 (1992) (no standing to
pursue generalized grievance stemming from non-enforcement of federal law);
see also Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 469-79 (1994) (no Administrative
Procedure Act review of presidential decisions).
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tension with the prevailing national policy and is centered
in electorally significant swing states, presidential
aspirants anticipating a reasonably close election (not a
landslide) are likely to stake out positions deferential to
state policy autonomy. The presidential aspirant might be
an out-of-power candidate seeking the office for the first
time or an incumbent seeking re-election or seeking to
protect the election chances of his party’s choice of
successor. The policies may be reflected in campaign
statements or in actions taken by the re-election-conscious
incumbent. The statements and actions may be equivocal.
But, in the case of marijuana legalization, the 2012
presidential campaign reflected an environment in which
state policy choices were given considerable latitude:
neither party expressed unequivocal opposition to medical
marijuana legalization, nor did either party make
opposition to recreational marijuana legalization a focal
point issue.
It might thus be said that presidential electoral politics
can be a significant factor in safeguarding federalism. To
the extent that presidential electoral politics affect
presidential policies, the marijuana example illustrates how
even a low-key approach to enforcement of federal law can
go a long way toward creating a space for state policy
autonomy. And on the marijuana legalization issue in
particular, presidential electoral politics seems to have done
far more to preserve state policy autonomy than judicial
review has.

